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Abstract 
This study analyses how public R&D financing impacts the labour demand of companies. To 
our knowledge, no previous studies have distinguished the impact between a firm’s global and 
domestic employment. Our company-level panel data covers a period from 1997 to 2002. The 
statistical method employed in the study takes into account the possibility that receiving public 
support may be an endogenous factor. Our results suggest that public R&D financing increases 
both group-level and domestic R&D employment. We also analysed the impact of public R&D 
funding on employment other than in the R&D area, and found that it is not affected by public 
funding. It is possible, however, that such funding has an impact in the longer term.  
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Jyrki Ali-Yrkkö* 
1. Introduction 
According to the widely accepted view, the social return of R&D undertaken by firms is higher 
than the private return, thus unsurprisingly the public sector in almost all industrial countries 
tries to speed up technological change by using a variety of policy instruments, such as public 
R&D funding, national R&D laboratories and tax credits. Yet the stimulation of total R&D 
activity is hardly the ultimate goal of economic policy. Most of the previous studies have 
ignored the fundamental issue of whether public R&D funding actually leads to improved 
productivity, higher GDP, employment and welfare. This study focuses on the issue of how 
public R&D funding impacts employment.  
Even though innovation is widely seen as an important source of growth, the impact of 
innovation on employment at the firm level remains unclear. One source of this uncertainty is 
the different nature of process and product innovations. Process innovations aim at improving 
productivity by enabling firms to achieve the same output with fewer resources. Thus, at least in 
the short run, process innovation may lead to job losses. In the long run, however, the improved 
competitiveness of the firm may stimulate demand leading to increases in output and 
employment (Harrison et al., 2005). Unsurprisingly the empirical evidence is mixed. Although a 
number of studies have found a negative correlation between process innovations and 
employment (e.g. Antonucci & Pianta, 2002), other studies have reported a positive relationship 
(Blanchflower & Burgess, 1998). Successful product innovations, in turn, tend to lead to 
increases in employment. Yet in practice, the distinction between process and product 
innovation is not always clear. New products potentially imply changes in the production 
process leading to productivity increases. 
In sum, the results of existing studies concerning the relationship between innovation and 
employment vary. In this paper, we study a special kind of innovation, namely firms’ R&D 
funded by government, and its impact on employment.  
To our knowledge, no previous studies have distinguished between the effect on a firm’s global 
employment and that on domestic employment. The stylised line of reasoning behind this issue 
is that the primary aim of technology policy is to promote the competitiveness of the national 
economy by technological means. Because the objective is to create domestic benefits, it is 
essential to differentiate between domestic and overseas impacts of the public R&D funding. 
Another new aspect of this study is that we also make a distinction between the effects of public 
funding on R&D and non-R&D employment; however, our data does not allow us to distinguish 
non-R&D employment further (e.g. production employment or maintenance employment).  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 includes relevant theoretical and 
empirical literature concerning the relationship between public and private R&D funding and 
the impacts on employment. Section 3 contains the description of the data. Section 4 gives an 
empirical analysis and results. Section 5 contains a summary and concluding remarks.  
2. Literature  review 
The main argument for public R&D funding is that the social return of R&D is higher than the 
private return and thus from the perspective of the national economy, firms under invest in 2 | JYRKI ALI-YRKKÖ 
 
R&D. Under-investment occurs because imperfect capital markets prevent companies from 
investing in all R&D projects with a positive net present value (NPV), or because the results of 
R&D spill over to other organisations.  
Even though public R&D funding has several potential positive impacts, its real effect depends 
heavily on whether public R&D funding actually augments the total R&D expenditure of firms. 
Even though a number of empirical studies have addressed this issue, recent literature 
(Wallsten, 2000 and Klette, Moen & Griliches, 2000) has questioned the results of numerous 
previous studies with an argument that only a few studies have explicitly taken into account the 
potential endogeneity of public funding. Next, we briefly review the empirical literature where 
the endogeneity of public funding is controlled. 
Wallsten (2000) examines the same SBIR programme as Lerner (1999) but points out the 
importance of taking into account the endogeneity of grants. Using the instrumental variable 
approach, Wallsten reports an (almost) full crowding-out effect. Busom (1999) analyses 154 
Spanish firms of which roughly 50% have received public subsidies. Owing to the data 
limitations, Busom is unable to make an exact estimate of crowding out or complementary. 
Nevertheless, her endogeneity-controlled analyses suggest that 41 companies spent more on 
R&D than they would have without the subsidy and 29 firms would have spent at least as much 
as in the case of no subsidy. Czarnitzki & Fier (2002) examine 210 German service firms. 
Applying a non-parametric matching approach, they find evidence that public funding has 
fostered the private innovation efforts of firms. By analysing more than 1,600 French firms, 
Duguet (2003) concludes that no significant substitution effect appears. Similar results have also 
been reported by Almus & Czarnitzki (2002), Hussinger (2003) and Gonzalez, Jaumandreu & 
Pazo (forthcoming). The evidence from Israel (Lach, 2000) suggests that subsidies do not 
completely crowd out private R&D. Lehto (2000) analyses the effect of public funding on total 
R&D spending of Finnish plants and concludes that publicly funded R&D does not crowd out 
private R&D. Niininen & Toivanen (2000) apply a simultaneous equations approach and find 
evidence that Finnish firms with moderate cash flow add their own R&D expenditure as a 
response to a subsidy, but when the cash flow is large enough, the positive relationship between 
subsidy and private R&D disappears. By examining Finnish firms in the period 1996-2002, Ali-
Yrkkö (2004) concludes that receiving a positive decision on obtaining public R&D funding 
increases privately financed R&D. The results also suggest that this additionality effect is bigger 
in large firms than in small firms.  
To our knowledge, only a few studies have analysed the employment effect of public R&D 
funding. According to Lerner (1999), public R&D funding increases the labour demand of firms 
located in geographic areas with a high degree of venture-capital activity. Using the 
instrumental variable approach, Wallsten (2000) concludes that public funding has no effect on 
employment. Suetens (2002) reports the opposite result when analysing the impact of public 
R&D funding on R&D employment using a panel data of Flemish firms. Ebersberger (2004) 
utilised kernel-based matching and differences-in-differences techniques to analyse the labour 
demand effects of public R&D funding in Finland. The results suggest that during the R&D 
project the employment growth rates do not differ between subsidised and non-subsidised firms. 
After the project, however, the average growth of employment is positive in subsidised firms 
but negative in non-subsidised firms. Thus, the results imply that in the longer run public R&D 
funding has a positive impact on employment.  
There are two main caveats in the existing literature. First, employment impacts have been 
studied at the business group level without distinguishing domestic and overseas effects. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) statistics show that during the past decade, overseas operations 
increased substantially (World Investment Report, 2004). Thus, it is essential to take into 
account that global impacts might differ from domestic effects. Second, the existing evaluation IMPACT OF PUBLIC R&D FINANCING ON EMPLOYMENT | 3 
studies have not distinguished between impacts on heterogeneous workers. It is possible that 
public R&D funding affects R&D employees differently from non-R&D employees (all other 
than R&D employees).
1 Our purpose is to extend the existing public R&D funding literature by 
differentiating between the effects on the total (global) employment and domestic employment. 
Furthermore, we separately analyse the impact of public funding on R&D employment and non-
R&D employment. 
3.  Description of the data 
Our data is a unique company-level dataset consisting of Finnish companies operating in 
different industries. Three separate data sources have been merged that make it possible to take 
into account a large set of explanatory variables. The information of both the total and the 
domestic employment is based on an investment survey conducted by The Confederation of 
Finnish Industry and Employers. Into this data, we have added the information of companies’ 
financial statements provided by Balance Consulting and Talouselämä magazine. Finally, the 
data concerning the public R&D funding from the Finnish Technology Agency (Tekes) has 
been merged together with the two datasets mentioned. 
In contrast to many previous studies, we are able to differentiate between firms that 1) have 
applied for and obtained public funding; b) applied for funding but obtained only part of the 
amount for which they applied; c) applied for funding and been rejected; and d) firms that have 
not even applied for public funding. Thus, our dataset allows us to distinguish between firms 
that applied for funding but were denied and those that did not even apply.  
With respect to the public funding variable, the choice between the subsidy granted and actually 
paid had to be made. Although both alternatives include advantages and disadvantages, we 
follow the study by Meeusen & Janssens (2001) and use subsidies granted.
2 
Our unbalanced database consists of 187 companies with various time series.
3 Companies with 
only single observations are excluded from the sample, thus our data includes only those 
companies with two or more annual observations. Table 1 describes the data.  Our data consists 
of a pooled sample of companies over the six-year period from 1997 to 2002. On average, 
approximately 40% of the companies in our sample have received public funding. This share 
has remained rather stable during the period 1997-2002. Among the subsidised companies, 
during 1997-2002 the average share of public funding of the total R&D expenditure is 12%. In 
terms of this ratio, no trend can be observed in 1997-2002. 
The comparison between the subsidised and non-subsidised (see Appendix) suggests that in 
terms of net sales the subsidised are, on average, larger than the non-subsidised. Furthermore, 
the subsidised have more employees at both the global and the domestic level.  
                                                      
1 We define non-R&D employment as follows: non-R&D employment = total employment – R&D 
employment. 
2  For the sake of simplicity, in the rest of the paper we have used public R&D funding, public funding 
and public funding granted as synonyms.  
3 To control the potential bias caused by outliers, in terms of net sales 5% of the biggest firms are 
excluded from the sample. 4 | JYRKI ALI-YRKKÖ 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
  Number of 
observations 
Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum
Global R&D employment  560  25.38  7  79.66  1  849 
Global non-R&D employment  557  424.39 229  525.36  1  3734 
Domestic R&D employment  560  21.45  7  56.54  1  586 
Domestic non-R&D 
employment  492 358.29 213 401.12  1  2860 
Total R&D, (€ millions)  560  1.88  0.6  4.69  0.0075  49.88 
Private R&D (€ millions)  560  1.80  0.57  4.62  0.0075  49.88 
Public funding (granted),  
(€ millions)  560 0.096  0  0.32  0  5.06 
Public funding (paid), 
(€ millions)  560 0.075  0  0.2  0  2.04 
Net sales, (€ millions)  560  71.9  36.7  87.04  0.89  461.2 
Wages/user cost  557  0.2  0.19  0.08  0.0025  0.58 
Operating profit/net sales  560  0.11  0.11  0.1  0  0.69 
Source: Author’s data. 
The existing literature indicates that foreign direct investment (FDI) in research and 
development (R&D) has increased (see for example Jungmittag, Meyer-Krahmer & Reger, 
1999). The annual breakdown of our sample shows that in Finland overseas R&D operations 
have also increased. In terms of R&D employees, on average 9% of firms have foreign R&D 
operations, which represent on average 24% of their total R&D employment. The share of R&D 
employees abroad of the total R&D employment has risen during the past years. While in 1998 
R&D employees abroad represented 17% of the total R&D employment of those companies 
with R&D staff abroad, in 2002 the share had risen to 32%. Evidently, foreign R&D is not a 
marginal operation mode in technology development.  
4. Empirical  analysis   
Our estimation strategy proceeds as follows. First, we present OLS and instrumental-variable 
regressions of R&D employment on subsidies. Our data enables us to distinguish the impact on 
total and domestic R&D employment. We then extend the analysis to also cover employees 
other than those working in R&D. Hence, in these cases our dependent variables are the total 
non-R&D and domestic non-R&D employment. 
4.1  Impact on R&D employment 
We use a standard textbook model (see Bresson, Kramarz & Sevestre, 1996) and consider an 
output-constrained firm having a technological constraint that can be represented by a Cobb-
Douglas production function and facing quadratic adjustment costs. Denoting by  τ + t tZ E  the 
expectation about  τ + t Z , formed at time t, the path of the firm’s future employment is 
determined by minimising its expected costs ( ) t C : IMPACT OF PUBLIC R&D FINANCING ON EMPLOYMENT | 5 
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where  t L  is the number of employees,  t K  is the capital stock,  t Q  is the production, r is the 
discount rate,  t c  is the user cost of capital,  t w  is the wage rate, d and e define the quadratic 
adjustment costs. Through Euler conditions and using the log approximation, the final dynamic 
employment equation added by an error term ( t v ) is (for derivation, see Bresson, Kramarz & 
Sevestre, 1996): 
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where subscript t is time index,  t L  is the number of employees,  t Q  is production,  t w  is wage 
per employee,  t c  is user cost of capital and  t v  is an error term. To capture the potential impact 
of public R&D funding, we include the lagged public R&D funding regressor ( 1 − t PUBLIC ) in 
the equation (3) leading to:   
  + + + + = − − 1 3 2 1 1 log log log log t t t t Q Q L L β β β α  
  t t
t t
v PUBLIC
c
w
c
w
+ + ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ + ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
−
−
1 6
1
5 4 log log β β β  (4) 
In equation (4) our special interest is focused on the coefficient  6 β  measuring the relative 
response of employment to an absolute change of public R&D funding (in € millions).  Thus, it 
describes the relative (percentage change if the relative change is multiplied by 100) change of 
firms’ employment if public R&D funding changes by €1 million. 
First, we estimate the model (4) by using the ordinary least-squares (OLS) method. This 
method, however, ignores the possibility that public funding is an endogenous variable. To 
control the potential endogeneity, an instrument variable (IV) method is used. An appropriate 
instrument correlates with the endogenous public funding variable but is not correlated with 
unobserved factors that have an impact on the dependent variable. According to Lichtenberg 
(1988) and Wallsten (2000), one ideal instrument is the value of funds that are potentially 
awardable to firm i in year t.  
Following Wallsten (2000), for firms that have applied for public funding, we define the 
instrument,  it BUDGET , as follows:  
  ( ) at
i
at it T TEKESBUDGE AWARD BUDGET × = , (5) 
where subscripts i, a, and t refers to firm, industry and year, respectively. The dummy variable 
i
at AWARD  gets a value of 1 if the company i operating in industry a obtains public funding in 
year t. The variable  at T TEKESBUDGE  is Tekes’s budget for industry a in year t. Similarly, 
for a firm that applied in year t but was rejected,  it BUDGET  is defined as Tekes’s budget for 
industry a in year t.  6 | JYRKI ALI-YRKKÖ 
 
For firms that have never applied for Tekes-funding, the calculation of  it BUDGET  is more 
complicated. In this case, we have first calculated the probability of receiving funding if the 
firm had applied for it. The probability has been calculated by dividing the number of firms in 
industry a that received public funding by the total number of firms in industry a that applied. 
Then this probability,  ) ( at AWARD p , has been multiplied by Tekes’s budget 
( at T TEKESBUDGE ) for industry a in year t (equation 3).  
  ( ) at at it T TEKESBUDGE AWARD p BUDGET × = ) (  (6) 
The columns (a) and (b) in Table 2 report the results of the OLS and instrument variable (IV) 
regressions of equation (4) by using the total number of R&D employees as a dependent 
variable. In columns (c) and (d) we have replaced the dependent variable and used the number 
of domestic R&D employees as a dependent variable. 
Table 2. Effects of public R&D funding on R&D employment 
Dependent variable  Log(Global R&D  
employment) 
Log(Domestic R&D  
employment) 
  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d) 
  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
Log(Global R&D 
employment t-1) 
.9220567***   
(.0274308) 
.9063352***  
.0232343 
–  – 
Log(Domestic R&D 
employmentt-1) 
–  –  .9227595***   
.0271935 
.907516***   
.0237877 
(Public funding)t-1  .1140658***   
(.0251467) 
.3695531*   
.2074826 
.087303***   
.0234919 
.3325074*   
.1958537 
Log(wagest/user costt )  .1311986***   
(.051654) 
.1129809**   
(.0531724) 
.1379752***   
(.0513775) 
.1203735**   
(.0517786) 
Log(wagest-1/user costt-1)  -.1162224**   
(.0493784) 
-.0979935*   
(.0520032) 
-.1289149***   
(.0482916) 
-.1112445**   
(.0500082) 
Log(Productiont)  .0083795   
(.0803107) 
-.0123865   
(.0762868) 
-.0314135   
(.0755972) 
-.0505165   
(.0721074) 
Log(Productiont-1)  .0444607   
(.0778023) 
.0594624   
(.0734954) 
.0768709   
(.0736483) 
.0902483   
(.0699681) 
Constant         
+ Industry dummies         
+ Year dummies         
Number of observations  560  560  560  560 
F-test (joint)  721.69  7.32  907.2  7.31 
      P-value  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
R
2  0.95  –  0.95  – 
* = significant at the 10% level 
** = significant at the 5% level 
*** = significant at the 1% level 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
Instruments (column b): Year dummies, industry dummies, BUDGET(t-1), total R&D employment (t-1), 
wages/user cost (t), wages/user cost (t-1), production (t), production (t-1). 
Instruments (column d): Year dummies, industry dummies, BUDGET(t-1), domestic R&D employment (t-1), 
wages/user cost (t), wages/user cost (t-1), production (t), production (t-1). 
F-test = tests the hypothesis that all coefficients excluding constant are zero. 
Source: Author’s calculations. IMPACT OF PUBLIC R&D FINANCING ON EMPLOYMENT | 7 
According to the OLS estimation (column a in Table 2), the coefficient for the public funding in 
time  t-1 is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting the positive 
correlation between public R&D funding and the total R&D employment. The coefficient of the 
wage/user cost ratio in time t  is surprisingly positive and statistically significant. Yet the 
coefficient of the lagged wage/user cost is negative and statistically significant. Some previous 
studies (e.g. Bresson et. al., 1992) have also reported opposite signs of the coefficient of the 
wage/user cost variable in different periods.
4 
These OLS estimates, however, might be biased because of the presence of the endogeneity of 
the public funding variable (see Wallsten, 2000). To control the potential endogeneity of public 
funding, IV estimation was carried out (column b).
5 Again, the public funding has a positive and 
statistically significant impact on labour demand. Hence in contrast to Wallsten’s study (2000), 
controlling endogeneity does not change the positive impact of public funding.  
These two estimations (columns a and b), however, do not take into account the possibility that 
firms have increased their R&D employment abroad instead of domestically. From the 
perspective of national economic policy, decision-makers are primarily interested in impacts on 
the domestic economy. To address this concern, we have re-estimated the models by using 
domestic R&D employment as a dependent variable (columns c and d). The results of these 
estimations suggest that there is a positive correlation between public R&D funding and 
domestic R&D employment. To calculate the economic magnitude of our results (column d), we 
multiply the coefficient of public funding (0.3325) by the mean of R&D employment (21.45). 
Thus, domestic R&D employment increases by seven employees when a company obtains €1 
million public funding. Respectively, the global (total) R&D employment increases by nine 
employees when a company obtains €1 million public funding (column b). In sum, our results 
indicate that public R&D funding positively impacts both domestic and global R&D 
employment.
6 We also used a generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator (see Blundell 
& Bond, 1998) to estimate equation (4) (see robustness tests in section 4.3). But in constructing 
first differences and instruments, we lose several observations. 
4.2 Impact  on  non-R&D  employment 
Next, we explore how public R&D funding impacts employment other than that in R&D. If 
R&D employees succeed in developing new products or increasing the competitiveness of 
firms, presumably there will be a general staff increase. Product innovations are more likely to 
lead to increases in employment but process innovations also potentially lead to job increases in 
the long run. In some cases, however, the short-term impacts of process innovations are 
probably negative. The previous literature (e.g. Bresson, Kramarz & Sevestre, 1992) suggests 
that an aggregate labour demand model can lead to erroneous conclusions if the employment of 
a given category of employees decreases while it increases for others.  
                                                      
4 We also estimated equations without the public funding regressor (see Appendix). According to the 
results of these estimations, the coefficients of wage/user cost and production were very similar as in 
equations with public funding (Tables 2 and 3).  
5 Our first-stage estimation (see Appendix) suggests that Budget is positively and statistically 
significantly correlated with public funding . 
6 We also estimated equations by using foreign R&D employment as the dependent variable (not 
reported). The results of these estimations suggest that public funding does not correlate in a statistically 
significant way with foreign R&D employment.  8 | JYRKI ALI-YRKKÖ 
 
To analyse the effect on total employment, we use employment other than in R&D (non-R&D 
employment) as a dependent variable. We first estimate the equation (4) by OLS and IV using 
global non-R&D employment as a dependent variable and then re-estimate equations by using 
domestic non-R&D employment as the dependent variable. The results are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. The impact of public funding on non-R&D employment  
Dependent variable:  Log(global non-R&D employment t) Log(domestic non-R&D employment t)
  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d) 
Log(other employment t-1)  .8257497***   
.0885548 
.8251021***   
(.0691643) 
–  – 
Log(domestic other 
employment t-1) 
    .8310909***   
(.0723669) 
.8286044***     
(.07549) 
(Public funding)t-1  .0168382   
(.0275636) 
.1794575   
(.1778181) 
-.0034888   
(.0293043) 
.198695   
(.1605382) 
Log(wagest/user costt )  .0504464   
(.0447735) 
.0368952   
(.0564625) 
.1177119**   
(.0448189) 
.0998554**   
(.0464304) 
Log(wagest-1/user costt-1)  .0272973   
(.0667947) 
.0375806   
(.0626664) 
-.073808   
(.0518724) 
-.0595196   
(.0516451) 
Log(productiont)  .2929509*   
(.1537272) 
.2800133**   
(.1362021) 
.1939886**   
(.0923247) 
.1767746**   
(.0875658) 
Log(productiont-1)  -.2371136*   
(.1399956) 
-.2311849*   
(.1374336) 
-.1181316   
(.0774028) 
-.1101425    
(.074387) 
Constant         
+ Industry dummies         
+ Year dummies         
Number of observations  554  554  456  456 
F-test (joint)  653.2  6.49  484.63  5.25 
      P-value  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
R
2  0.94  –  0.91  – 
* = significant at the 10% level  
** = significant at the 5% level 
*** = significant at the 1% level 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
Instruments:   Column c: Year dummies, industry dummies, BUDGET(t-1), global employment other than 
in R&D (t-1), wages/user cost (t), wages/user cost (t-1), production (t), production (t-1) 
Column d: Year dummies, industry dummies, BUDGET(t-1), domestic other than R&D 
employment(t-1), wages/user cost (t), wages/user cost (t-1), production(t), production(t-1) 
F-test = tests the hypothesis that all coefficients excluding constant are zero. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
The first point worth noticing is that in terms of public R&D funding all methods yield quite 
similar results. We find no evidence that public funding increases non-R&D employment. All 
the coefficients of public R&D funding in Table 3 are statistically insignificant, indicating that 
public R&D funding has no effect on employment other than in R&D. It is possible, however, 
that the impact of public funding on non-R&D employment occurs in the longer run.  IMPACT OF PUBLIC R&D FINANCING ON EMPLOYMENT | 9 
In sum, our estimations suggest that public funding has a positive and statistically significant 
impact on R&D employment. Nevertheless, we found no evidence that public funding affects 
employment other than that in R&D (e.g. employees in production).  
4.3 Robustness  tests 
Next, we perform a series of robustness tests (to save space we do not report the tests in detail).  
Robustness test 1:  
Does the problem of weak instruments cause a bias in our results? To address this question, we 
re-estimate our models by using an additional instrument. While the correlation between 
it BUDGET  and  it PUBLIC  is 0.22 (see Appendix), the correlation between  it PUBLIC  and 
it APPLIED  (the amount of public funding that a company has applied for) is as high as 0.979. 
Yet it is hard to see why  it APPLIED  should correlate with the unobserved determinants of 
private R&D, conditional on the actual R&D funding received. We re-ran our models using this 
additional instrument. According to the results of these new regressions, our major result that 
public R&D funding increases domestic R&D employment holds. 
Robustness test 2:  
Do our results change if we take into account firm-specific effects? To test this concern, in 
dynamic models it is necessary to use a GMM estimator. By taking first differences and 
constructing an appropriate instrument set, however, we lose several cross-sections. We 
followed Blundell & Bond (1998) and used both lagged level and differenced variables as 
instruments. The results of these new regressions show that our basic results hold (see 
Appendix). First, when domestic R&D employment is used as the dependent variable, the 
coefficient of public R&D funding remains positive and statistically significant (t-value 3.01). 
Second, public R&D funding does not have a statistically significant impact on non-R&D 
employment (t-value 0.92). 
Robustness test 3:  
To test whether the public R&D funding impacts non-R&D employment in the longer run, we 
re-ran our models three times by lagging the public funding regressor by two, three and four 
years, respectively. The results of these new estimations support our previous findings that 
public R&D funding does not have a statistically significant effect on non-R&D employment.  
Robustness test 4:  
To what extent are our results specific to the period on which we focus? To address this 
question, we ran our models separately for the period 1997-2000 and 2001-2002. The results of 
these new regressions indicate the following: first, public R&D funding has no statistically 
significant impact on employment other than in R&D either in the period 1997-2000 or in 2001-
02. Second, public funding increases domestic R&D employment in the period 2001-02 (t-value 
2.3) but not in 1997-2000 (t-value -1.4). Even though our sample is too short to reach a definite 
conclusion, the result potentially indicates that the impact of public R&D funding is different 
during economic booms and recessions. The wage inflation of R&D employees is one 
interpretation of the empirical result that during the economic boom in 1997-2000, public 
funding did not increase employment. Thus during the economic boom in 1997-2000, a 
significant fraction of increased R&D spending potentially went into higher wages of R&D 
employees (as proposed by Goolsbee, 1998) instead of the number of R&D employees. During 
the recession in 2001-02, however, public funding increased the number of domestic R&D 
employees.  10 | JYRKI ALI-YRKKÖ 
 
5. Conclusions 
This study has analysed the impact of public R&D funding on employment by using firm-level 
data on Finnish companies during 1997-2002. This paper contributes to the existing literature in 
two ways. First, we have distinguished between the impacts of public funding on a firm’s total 
and domestic employment. Owing to increasing overseas activity both in production and R&D 
operations, it is essential to differentiate between global and domestic effects. Second, we have 
also separately estimated the impact on both R&D and other employment. 
Our results suggest that public R&D funding has a positive and economically significant impact 
on domestic R&D employment. From the perspective of national economic policy, it is 
important that the policy has positive impacts, particularly domestically. 
We have also examined whether the public funding has an effect on employment outside the 
R&D domain, and found no evidence that this is the case domestically. Nor did the result 
change when we examined the impacts on the other employment at the group’s global level.   
Our results have several important policy implications. First, they do not support the view that 
the only effect of public R&D financing is to raise the wages of researchers (Goolsbee, 1998). 
In contrast, they show that public R&D funding does have a positive impact on the R&D labour 
demand. Yet we also found that during economic booms the impact of public funding on R&D 
employment can be different from that during recessions. Although our estimations suggest that 
during the economic slowdown (2001-02), public funding increased the number of R&D 
employees, we have not observed a similar relationship during the economic boom in 1997-
2000. Second, we found no evidence that public R&D funding increases the labour demand of 
employment other than that in R&D, at least in the short term. This is an important result, 
because rather than increased innovation, the ultimate goals of economic policy are more in the 
realm of improved competitiveness, increased exports, increased employment and finally 
improved welfare. 
Owing to data limitations, there are several topics left for future research. First, our data has not 
allowed us to separate public funding directed at process innovations and product innovations. 
Thus, our estimates have captured an average relationship, which may hide impact differences 
between these two types of developments. Second, to analyse the impact of public funding on 
non-R&D employment more rigorously, data with a longer time series is needed. The delay 
from R&D to pilot production then to full production potentially takes several years and this 
should be taken into account in future studies. Third, the widely accepted major rationale for 
public R&D funding is the spill-over effect, that is, the output of an R&D project spills over to 
other organisations. To examine the aggregate impact of public funding on employment, one 
should also take into account the employment effects caused by such spillovers. | 11 
Appendix 
Data appendix  
The data related to financial reports came from Balance Consulting Ltd. and Talouselämä 
magazine’s top 500 database. All variables are deflated using the GDP price index (2000=100). 
Employment 
The total (worldwide) number of employees of the firm as reported in the investment 
survey by the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers or in the database of 
Balance Consulting Ltd. 
Domestic employment 
The total number of employees of the firm in Finland as reported in the investment survey 
by the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers.  
R&D employment 
The total number of R&D employees of the firm as reported in the investment survey by 
the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers.  
Domestic R&D employment 
The number of R&D employees of the firm in Finland as reported in the investment 
survey by the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers.  
Wages 
Total wages (including social expenses) came directly from the income statement of the 
firm. Wage per employee has been calculated by dividing total wages by total 
employment.  
User cost 
To calculate the firm-level user cost of capital  it c  we use the following equation 
(Koskenkylä 1985 and Pyyhtiä, 1991):  
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where  i=1,...,N and t=1,...,T, and  
pt
I  = price of investment 
[] Ep t
I
•
 = expected change in the prices of capital goods. Calculated by taking an average 
of the inflation rate of capital goods (source: Statistics Finland) during the past five years. 
r it = the interest rate. The firm-level interest rate has been calculated by dividing interest 
rate expenditure by interest-bearing debt. 12 | JYRKI ALI-YRKKÖ 
 
δ
A = economic rate of depreciation of the capital stock. The industry-level depreciation 
rate has been calculated from our sample by adding up the depreciation of all companies 
and dividing it by the sum of fixed assets. 
τt  = corporate tax rate.  
α  = The maximum rate of depreciation in taxation on the total un-depreciated capital 
stock. 
pt
o  = price of output (source: Statistics Finland) 
Total R&D expenditure 
Total R&D expenditure (irrespective of financing) of the firm as reported in the 
investment survey by the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers.  
Public R&D funding 
This data came from the National Technology Agency (Tekes). Public funding includes 
R&D loans and subsidies.  
Privately financed R&D 
Privately financed R&D has been calculated by subtracting public R&D funding from the 
total R&D expenditure.  
Sales 
Net sales came directly from the income statement of the firm.  
Table A.1 Descriptive statistics (means and two-tailed t-tests for means) by subsidised and non-
subsidised firms 
  Firms without 
subsidy at t 
Firms with 
subsidy at t 
t-value  p-value 
Global R&D employment  21.6  30.9  -1.358  0.175 
Global other than R&D 
employment 
314.2 583.4  -6.14  <0.0001 
Domestic R&D employment  18.1  26.4  -1.7  0.089 
Domestic other than R&D 
employment 
271.1 490  -6.14  <0.0001 
Total R&D, (€ millions)  1.45  2.5  2.6  0.01 
Net sales (€ millions)  55.71  95.47  -5.45  <0.0001 
Wages/user cost  0.205  0.204  0.149  0.88 
Operating profit/net sales  0.12  0.105  2.07  0.039 
Source: Author’s calculations. IMPACT OF PUBLIC R&D FINANCING ON EMPLOYMENT | 13 
Table A.2 Correlation matrix  
  Total 
R&D 
exp. 
R&D 
emp. 
Domes-
tic R&D 
emp. 
Other 
than 
R&D 
emp. 
Domes-
tic other 
than 
R&D 
emp. 
Net 
sales 
Wage/ 
user 
cost 
Public 
funding 
(granted) 
Budget   Public 
funding 
(applied 
for) 
Total R&D 
expenditure 
1.0000  – –  – –  – – –  – – 
R&D  emp. 0.8529  1.0000  –  – –  – – –  – – 
Domestic  
R&D emp. 
0.8645  0.9222  1.0000  – –  – – –  – – 
Other than  
R&D emp. 
0.1487  0.1511  0.1554  1.0000  – –  –  – –  – 
Domestic other 
than R&D emp. 
0.1423 0.1171 0.1250  0.8813 1.0000  –  –  –  –  – 
Net sales  0.1600  0.1708  0.1482  0.8168 0.7501  1.0000 –  –  –  – 
Wage/user cost  0.0083  -0.0006  0.0042 -0.0801 -0.0423  0.0800  1.0000  –  –  – 
Public funding  0.2274  0.1672  0.1478  0.1392 0.1410  0.1516 -0.0669 1.0000  –  – 
Budget 0.0861  0.0609  0.0560  -0.1396 -0.1410 -0.2120 -0.0540 0.2285  1.0000  – 
Public funding 
applied for 
0.2303 0.1851 0.1575  0.1603 0.1635  0.1726 -0.0618 0.9793  0.2344 1.000 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Table A.3 First-stage regressions (IV regressions in Table 4.1) 
  Column b in Table 4.1  Column d  in Table 4.1 
Dependent variable  Public funding (t-1)  Public funding (t-1) 
Log(Global R&D employment t-1)  .048582***   .0129804  – 
Log(Domestic R&D  
employmentt-1) 
–  0488473***     
(.013121) 
(Budget)t-1  .015649***   (.0022426)  .0156322***   (.0022438) 
Log(wagest/user costt )  .0632884   (.0426067)  .0637233   (.0426065) 
Log(wagest-1/user costt-1)  -.0727046*   (.0428565)  -.0732252*   (.0428696) 
Log(Salest)  .1033919   (.0691468)  .1007122   (.0691616) 
Log(Salest-1)  -.0749687   (.0699512)  -.0715914   (.0699115) 
Constant     
+ Industry dummies     
+ Year dummies     
Number of observations  560  560 
F-test (joint)  7.32  7.31 
      P-value  <0.001  <0.001 
R
2  0.21  0.21 
Source: Author’s calculations. 14 | JYRKI ALI-YRKKÖ 
 
Table A.4 GMM estimations  
  GMM  GMM 
  (a)  (b) 
Dependent variable  Log (domestic other than 
R&D employment)t 
Log (domestic R&D employment)t
Log(domestic employment other than 
in R&D t-1) 
0.709594***     (0.1874)  – 
Log(domestic R&D employment t-1)  –  0.973984***     
(0.04172) 
(Public funding)t-1  0.0356170     
(0.03863) 
0.111782***     
(0.03718) 
Log(wagest/user costt )  0.279517     
 (0.2362) 
0.349629      
(0.3118) 
Log(wagest-1/user costt-1)  -0.139557      
(0.1828) 
-0.471645*      
(0.2803) 
Log(Salest)  0.266184      
(0.1874) 
-0.117083      
(0.3445) 
Log(Salest-1)  -0.205643      
(0.2159) 
0.143528      
(0.3526) 
     
Constant     
+ Year dummies     
     
Number of observations  264  321 
Wald (joint)  472.7  1590.0 
Sargan [p-value]  22.43 [0.263]  18.97 [0.459] 
AR(1) test  -1.776  -2.051 
AR(2) test  -0.7301  -1.568 
Notes:   
i) The Wald (joint) statistic is a test of the joint significance of the independent variables. 
ii) Sargan is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributes as 
2 χ under the null of instrument 
validity. 
iii) AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0.1) under the null of no serial correlation. 
iv) The GMM estimates reported are all one step estimates. 
v) The public funding variable has been instrumented by BUDGET. 
vi) The results are obtained using DPD for Ox (see Doornik, Arellano & Bond, 2001).  
Source: Author’s calculations. IMPACT OF PUBLIC R&D FINANCING ON EMPLOYMENT | 15 
Table A.5 Employment estimations without the public funding regressor  
Dependent variable  Log(global 
R&D  
employment) 
Log(domestic 
R&D  
employment) 
Log(global non-
R&D 
employment t) 
Log(domestic non-
R&D 
employment t) 
  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
Log(global R&D employment 
t-1) 
.9290758***   
(.0269523) 
–  –  – 
Log(domestic R&D  
employmentt-1) 
–  .9281869***   
(.0265845) 
–  – 
log(global non-R&D 
employment t-1) 
–  –  .8258167***   
(.0884942) 
– 
log(domestic non-R&D 
employment t-1) 
–  –  –  .831048***   
(.07228179 
Log(wagest/user costt )  .1393322***   
(.051801) 
.1442422***   
(.0515858) 
.0518496   
(.0439196) 
.1174038***   
(.0448582) 
Log(wagest-1/user costt-1)  -.1243609**   
(.049107) 
-.1352063***   
(.0482129) 
.0262326   
(.0660318) 
-.0735615   
(.0521906) 
Log(Productiont)  .0176508   
(.0826674) 
-.024612   
(.0773755) 
.2942905*   
(.1547525) 
.1936916**   
(.0915823) 
Log(Productiont-1)  .0377629   
(.0801669) 
.072108    
(.075459) 
-.2377275*   
(.1405254) 
-.1179938   
(.0769955) 
Constant         
+ Industry dummies         
+ Year dummies         
Number of observations  560  560  554  456 
F-test (joint)  737.22  888.21  661.47  491.72 
      P-value  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
R
2  0.94  0.95  0.94  0.91 
* = significant at the 10% level 
** = significant at the 5% level 
*** = significant at the 1% level 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
F-test = tests the hypothesis that all coefficients excluding constant are zero. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Table A.7 The role of foreign R&D by year 
Year Number  of  firms  Number of firms with 
foreign R&D 
employment>0 
Mean (foreign R&D employment/global 
R&D employment*100) for firms with 
foreign R&D employment >0 
1998 81  5  16.9% 
1999 108  7  19.7% 
2000 119  11  27.2% 
2001 130  11  25.6% 
2002 122  16  31.9% 
Source: Author’s calculations. | 16 
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